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Graphology in Germany in the
1920s and 1930s
Amateurs, Psychologists, and the Police on the Scientific Nature of
Graphology
Laurens Schlicht
In this article I examine how psychologists, amateurs and actors in the police and in juridical fields positioned
themselves in the 1920s and 1930s on the scientific nature of graphology. Graphology, the study of the character
from handwriting, was linked with the hope of providing reliable methods for the investigation of psychological
states and dispositions. The essay argues that on an epistemic level two different models have been repre-
sented to support the scientific nature of graphology: for one thing resorting to the special individual skill, the
“genius” of a graphologist; or rather depersonalized techniques predominantly based on statistics. Amateur
graphologists used both of these forms.
On amethodological level, I argue that in order to historicize the human sciences in general, and psychology
in particular, it is useful to examine the translation processes that turn everyday interpretative practices (of facial
expressions, dreams, handwriting) into scientific legitimate investigative procedures. In order to investigate
precisely this translation process, it is useful to look at what Thomas Gieryn calls “boundary work” at the
border between scientific and non-scientific interpretation practices, for which graphology is used here as
an example. It is particularly illuminating to examine how representatives of the official sciences distinguish
themselves from presumed “charlatans”, which is why the article focuses on court cases and the demarcation
strategies used by the police against fraudulent amateur graphologists.
Keywords: Graphology, History of the Human Sciences, Weimar Republic, National Socialism, History of Psy-
chology
Graphologie in Deutschland in den 1920ern und 1930ern. Amateur*innen, Psycholog*innen und die Polizei über
die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Graphologie
In dem Aufsatz wird untersucht, in welcher Weise sich Psycholog*innen, Amateur*innen und Akteur*innen
der Polizei und des Rechtswesens in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren zur Wissenschaftlichkeit der Graphologie
positioniert haben. Mit der Graphologie, der Lehre von der Deutung der Handschrift als Ausdruck des Charak-
ters, war die Hoffnung verbunden worden, zuverlässige Methoden zur Untersuchung psychischer Zustände und
Dispositionen zur Verfügung zu haben. In dem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass auf epistemischer Ebene zwei
verschiedene Modelle vertreten worden sind, um die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Graphologie zu untermauern:
zum einen der Rekurs auf eine spezielle persönliche Eignung, das „Genie“, des Graphologen, zum anderen ent-
personalisierte, zumeist statistisch gestützte Techniken. Die Amateurgraphologen haben sich auf beide Formen
bezogen.
Auf methodologischer Ebene argumentiere ich, dass es zur Historisierung der Wissenschaften von der
Psyche im Allgemeinen und der Psychologie im Besonderen nützlich sein kann, den Übersetzungsprozess
zu untersuchen, der aus alltäglichen Deutungspraktiken (wie etwa des Gesichtsausdrucks, von Träumen,
der Handschrift) wissenschaftlich legitim erscheinende Untersuchungsverfahren macht. Um genau diesen
Übersetzungsprozesses zu untersuchen wird das „boundary work“ (Thomas Gieryn) an der Grenze von wis-
senschaftlichen und nicht-wissenschaftlichen Deutungspraktiken am Beispiel der Graphologie betrachtet.
Dabei erweist sich als besonders aufschlussreich zu untersuchen, wie sich Vertreter*innen offizieller Wis-
senschaften von den mutmaßlichen „Scharlatanen“ abgrenzten. Der zentrale Quellentypus, auf dem der
Artikel beruht, sind deshalb Gerichtsprozesse gegen Amateurgraphologen, denen Betrug vorgeworfen wurde,
in denen explizit gemacht werden musste, was die Wissenschaftlichkeit von Graphologie ausmachte.
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Paul Papst considered himself a “psychologist,” and thus capable of under-
standing the character and the inclinations of men and locating the latter
in the brain. That much he explained to the law enforcement authorities
during his interrogation for fraud. Albert Hellwig, a judge and prominent
author of research on peripheral scientific areas (such as occultism or
parapsychology) provided an expert testimony for Papst’s trial in . His
expert opinion reflects the self-portrayal of Papst in his interrogation:
Paul Papst calls himself a psychologist. During his responsible inter-
rogation he stated that he worked as a graphologist and phrenologist
as well as in the fields of biochemistry, suggestion and occultism. By
graphology he understood the study of writing for the assessment of
characters, the nervous system and the life of the soul. By psychology
he understood the evaluation of the character and the inclinations of
men respectively their localization in the brain. By biochemistry he
understood the healing treatment using chemical salts. By suggestion
he understood the influencing of the state of the soul for the heal-
ing of emotional and similar ailments. He said that he acquired the
knowledge in this field by studying scientific writings.
From the s Germany onwards, graphology—the science of in-
ferring the character of a person from the peculiarities of her or his
handwriting—typically was a case of discussing what constitutes the
legitimacy of scientific practices for evidencing the mind or the char-
acter of human beings. Since graphology made knowledge claims about
mental states—the “mind,” “intentions,” “character”—especially psychol-
ogists either proclaimed their own scientificity by distancing themselves
from graphology, or further developed their own versions of graphol-
ogy. Graphology thus became a field of knowledge triggering discussions,
which practices could legitimately generate knowledge about the character,
personality, or intentions of persons (for the sake of shortness I will call
them “evidence techniques” in the following). In this respect, graphology
competed with a number of more or less old methods of accessing the
human mind by analysing its physical artefacts, like phrenology, psycho-
logical methods of expression analysis (facial expression, gestures, etc.),
and commercial approaches to determine the “character” or “personality”
of possible employees pursued by psychotechnics (cf. Jaeger ). In
terms of Carlo Ginzburg, it can be said that graphology also followed the
150










increased interest in social classification, which in turn was linked to thegrowing need for differentiating types of human labour (Ginzburg ).
In this article I demonstrate how psychologists, jurists, and non-scien-
tific actors used graphology as an evidence technique. I will show that dur-
ing the period investigated here, at least two ways existed for psychologists
to demarcate their expertise as scientists at epistemic level: the first can be
called the “medical” model, and is built upon the figure of the graphologi-
cal genius. This model, which is exemplified by Roda Wieser (–),
Friedrich von Rohden (–), and Ludwig Klages (–), ar-
gues that it was possible and actually necessary to have some form of
graphological training based on some experimental knowledge or system-
atic differentiation of expression, but that still a good graphologist needed
“intuition”. The second model is the “statistical” model. The psychologist
Karl Marbe (–) in particular argued that only by establishing
statistical correlations graphology could possibly gain solid footing. This
approach relied on a depersonalized concept of knowledge that dispensed
with the person of the interpreter. A third model not to be analysed in this
article was the figure of the graphological medium, which was especially
relevant for the Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie; the neurologist and psy-
choanalyst Johannes Marcinowski (–) wanted to establish a form
of “meta-graphology” that could only be carried out by mediumistically
talented persons, and could be used for both, character analysis as well for
a range of seemingly otherworldly knowledge (cf. for example Marcinowski
; : ).
Secondly I want to highlight actors who are commonly excluded from
the scrutiny of scholarly attention: amateur graphologists, who offered their
services in non-scientific spaces, such as funfairs, pubs. I want to show that
with regard to these actors in particular, the question of the scientific na-
ture of evidence techniques required discussion and specific proposals for
practical solutions. For this purpose I will draw on court cases conserved in
the papers of Albert Hellwig (–) in the Freiburg Institute for Fron-
tier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health (IGPP), and in the Karl Marbe
papers conserved at the Adolf-Würth-Zentrum of Würzburg University
as well as on additional archival sources from the Staatsarchiv Leipzig as
well as some documents from the Otto Lipmann and William Stern papers
conserved in The National Library of Israel in Jerusalem. The evidence,
which can be traced in Hellwig’s and Marbe’s papers about the nature of
the practices of amateurs are sketchy, but, cautiously interpreted, they can
nevertheless provide some insight into the use of graphology outside the
academic universe of texts and practices. Then again, the court cases al-
low analysing the ways psychologists or psychologically trained jurists like
Hellwig used to document their understanding of science with juridical
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vigour: experts defending the scientificity of psychology had to distinguish
themselves from amateur practitioners by rendering their understanding
of what constitutes proper science explicit. Therefore, we can understand
here, why and how these psychologists believed in the superiority of their
practices of interpreting bodily expressions, and specifically handwriting.
A third type of material are archival sources on police practices to con-
trol graphologists from the Staatsarchiv Leipzig. They largely confirm the
statements of psychologists and jurists that graphology remained at the
interface between scientific and non-scientific practices of character diag-
nosis, and that is precisely why it triggered a discussion in the police.
Based on these analyses I will argue that graphology has to be char-
acterized as a paradigmatic case starting from which scientific and non-
scientific actors negotiated the nature of science, the legitimacy of belong-
ing to a scientific community, and the reliability of the means to know
a person’s character. Due to the interacting of everyday practices, exigen-
cies before court, and the quest for scientification graphology is a typical
case for discussing the boundaries of science—a prime example for what
Thomas Gieryn has called “boundary work” (Gieryn ).
Graphology is often and rightly associated with the name Ludwig Klages.
As research has shown, Klages was the leading figure for the German-
speaking world regarding graphology (Lebovic ). For example Emil
Utitz, a Jewish psychologist and characterologist, described Klages in 
as the “brilliant leader” of graphology (Utitz : ). Mitchell Ash has
pointed out that the methods of Klages were actually introduced in person-
nel administrations in the s (Ash : ). Students and admirers
of Klages like Philipp Lersch (–, see Gesicht und Seele, ) be-
came central figures of characterology in the “Third Reich”. Thus, graphol-
ogy, rooted in characterology, was also part of a culturally conservative,
anti-Semitic, and racist theoretical movement that later proved to be ex-
tremely attractive to the Nazis. But to emphasize only this aspect would
hide the fact that there was also an important Jewish tradition of charac-
terology and graphology (see Lebovic ). The two historical roots of
scientific graphology—experimental physiology and characterology—thus
formed political-epistemic reference points to format the status of the re-
spective versions of graphology.
The article is divided into four parts and a concluding section. In the
first part I clarify the perspective from which I want to study graphology.
In the second part I will discuss three selected court cases of amateur
graphologists, who were accused of fraud. The third part treats one reac-
tion to the widespread practice of graphological institutes in the s in
the consulting of enterprises and private individuals. The fourth part then
discusses reactions of Leipzig police headquarters in charge of the laws
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prohibiting clairvoyance, and hence had to decide whether graphologicalpractices were actually scientific or fraudulent. In the concluding section
I will discuss a possible approach to explain why graphology became such
a locus classicus for discussing boundaries of science and the techniques
interpreting human expression.
Research
Research on the history of graphology so far has been scarce. There is
the nineteenth-century history of graphology that is not relevant for the
scope of this article (Vars ). Notes on the history of graphology can
as well be found in contemporary treatments of the subject which are,
however, not sufficiently detailed and highly biased. Recent research on the
history of graphology focuses on its use in psychiatry (Schäfer ), and on
the discussion between Alfred Binet (–) and Jules Crépieux-Jamin
(–) (Nicolas et al. ). Nitzan Lebovic’s research is relevant for
a reassessment of the role of Ludwig Klages and characterology (Lebovic
).
One highly interesting article by Caspar Hirschi deals with the court
case on Alfred Dreyfus in . During the Dreyfus affair, as Hirschi points
out, graphological expert testimonies played a crucial part, since one major
question was if the so called “bordereau,” the unsigned and undated intel-
ligence note addressed to the German military attaché in Paris, Max von
Schwartzkoppen (–), had been written by Dreyfus or not (Hirschi
). His article provides some insight into the history of experts for
handwriting as well dating back to the late sixteenth century (ibid.: )
and that graphology was introduced as a science by Jan Hippolyte Michon
in  (ibid.: ). He comes to the conclusion that after the Dreyfus affair
graphology became discredited as a science, and was rather practised in
the spheres of private enterprises, used by “managers and head hunters”
(ibid.: ). Some details of Hirschi’s fascinating and insightful new inter-
pretation of the Dreyfus affair might nevertheless be questioned from the
history of science standpoint: one can agree with Hirschi that graphology
was not always clearly a scientific discipline in the first half of the twenti-
eth century. Then again, the following examples will show that the Dreyfus
affair was not “the beginning of the end of [graphology’s] aspiration to be
recognized as an exact science” (ibid.).
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Graphology as a Pseudoscience?
Graphology was one of many methods of interpreting bodily expression
in order to learn something about the psyche or the mind. Since the late
eighteenth century, various actors have tried to render these methods sci-
entific. These methods can be distinguished into self-observation and ex-
ternal observation. There is little research on the history of self-observation
(regarding nineteenth-century France, cf. Braunstein ). Since the early
nineteenth century a number of techniques have been used for the scien-
tific study of body interpretation (cf. Courtine &Haroche ; Schmölders
). A well-known technique is phrenology (measurement of the skull
to determine character traits and intelligence), whose prominent repre-
sentatives were the physicians Franz Joseph Gall (–) and Johann
Spurzheim (–) (cf. Wyhe ). Another technique was physiog-
nomy, which is strongly connected to the name of Johann Caspar Lavater
(–) (cf. Bindman : ff.; for the later history of the analysis of
emotions based on facial expressions in the twentieth century, Leys ).
In comparison with these evidence techniques, graphology was quite late
in trying to establish a canon of scientific norms and procedures, which
was particularly advanced by Jean-Hippolyte Michon (–) (cf. Vars
; Nicolas et al. ; Hirschi ).
In the second half of the nineteenth century, experimental psychology
and psychiatry also gave rise to fields of enquiry that provided various mea-
surement methods for the analysis of physical expression; this later led to
the measurement of “brain waves” with electroencephalography (cf. Borck
). With the establishment of psychology as an academic discipline
in the late nineteenth century, these new approaches opened up a frame
of reference to which graphology also had to relate. In the period dis-
cussed here, graphology behaved ambivalently, alternating between more
hermeneutic or phenomenological evidence techniques, and more statisti-
cal and instrumentally supported ones. In the psychiatric field, the kymo-
graph-based method of capturing human expression in the form of curves
on carbon black paper was linked to graphology. Against this background
handwriting was also sometimes called “brainwriting”, with reference to
the documentation of a state of mind by a natural curve in the form of
writing (Preyer ; Pophal ; Schäfer : ).
Based on different models of the human psyche, psychology was in-
terested in handwriting in the context of other methods of expression
analysis, which were then extensively used in Wehrmacht psychology (cf.
Geuter , ; Hofstätter ). Hence Austrian psychologist Peter
Hofstätter (–) used graphology, for example, in his experiments
with the “dark writing” (Dunkelschrift): by analysing handwriting produced
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in the dark Hofstätter sought to present a method of making the expressionof writing unaffected by other influences.
There has been too little discussion in recent decades about how to
write an epistemic history of evidence techniques. A theoretical frame-
work has been provided by Ian Hacking to analyse the process of differen-
tiation between subject constructions and subjects constructed (Hacking
; ). In his empirical study about the development of the sub-
ject category of the “abused child” Hacking, for example, highlighted the
institutional, political, and social logics with which this process of the es-
tablishment of institutions and subject strategies of “child abuse” became
interrelated (Hacking ). He argued that new forms of being a person
had been invented, which had unfolded in a complex interplay of concep-
tual attribution and self-interpretation (Hacking ).
With this article I want to contribute to the historical analysis of epis-
temic techniques to investigate mental states, or what Jan Goldstein has
called the “mental stuff”, that is, all kinds of objects or states (like mind,
psyche, intentions, fears) that is represented in the vocabulary to talk about
psychic things (Goldstein : )—called evidence techniques in this arti-
cle. I argue that it is a methodologically compelling option for analysing the
professionalisation strategies of evidence techniques in psychology to in-
vestigate knowledge fields that are represented both in- and outside the es-
oteric circles of science, like the interpretation of facial expression, dreams,
and graphology. Yet, the epistemic structure of psychology is characterized
by the fact that it not only introduces new concepts or practices for in-
terpreting behaviour or mental states but also reinterprets familiar ones.
Graphology undoubtedly belongs to the latter. Analysing this part makes
it necessary not to investigate the birth of an epistemic, social, or politi-
cal object in historical ontology but rather to make visible the translations
that enabled psychology and other human sciences to incorporate concepts
from ordinary language and everyday practice into the canon of science.
Graphology was lively discussed in the first half of the twentieth century,
and also after . If one believes Siegfried Kracauer (–) and his
famous study about The Salaried Masses (Die Angestellten), graphology
was widely used by enterprises to select higher employees (Kracauer 
[]: ). But at least in Germany and France (cf. Binet ), acknowl-
edged experts also pursued graphology from the s to the s, such
as for instance the psychiatrist Rudolf Pophal (–), who started lec-
turing on graphology at Greifswald University in . Also William Stern
(–), director of the renowned Institute for Psychology of Hamburg
University emphasized in  that alongside psychotechnical analyses of
the human performance, the character should likewise be studied with
the help of graphology (Stern : ). The report on the first post-war
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meeting of German psychologists disclosed that of the altogether  papers
delivered, six were on graphology (Bornemann & Bornemann ). When
psychologist Franziska Baumgarten (–) criticised graphology in
 for lacking an objective foundation, she received a letter from a friend
in Tel Aviv, in which he put graphology on a par with all other methods
of expression analysis. And when in  psychologist and visiting pro-
fessor at Harvard University Helmut von Bracken reported on the new
developments of German psychology, he underlined that graphology was
an important part of psychological research, forming part of the analysis of
“expressive movement,” referring to the works of Klages and Lersch among
others (Bracken : ). In  the Heidelberg Institute for Psychology
hosted a graphologists conference, which was attended by over  partic-
ipants. It also offered teaching positions for graphology since  (Jung
: –). In  Friedrich Koppe pointed out that “graphology has
already overcome its pre-scientific stage for over half a century” and that it
constituted to be a teaching subject at German universities (Koppe :
).
If you look at bibliographical data from the Bibliothèque nationale
(Paris), from the catalogue of Harvard Library, and from Deutsche Na-
tionalbibliothek, searching for books with the word “graphologie” resp.
“graphology” in the title, we can see some indications for the development
of graphology. Based on this bibliometric data, the general picture is not
uniform: In Germany you have an average of  (.) books per ten years
with a climax in the decade from – (), whereas there are as
well  and  books published in the decades of the s and s,
which compared to a supposed smaller total number of books published
might also be read as boost. The most important platform for dealing
with graphological questions was the Zeitschrift für Menschenkunde (und
Zentralblatt für Graphologie) first was published in . In France the
average of published books is . per ten years with a climax in s
( books), whereas here we do not see a climax in the s and s.
The Hollis Catalogue of Harvard University provides us with an average
of . books per ten years with a climax from – ( books).
Should graphology therefore be historically reconstructed in terms of
a “pseudoscience” (cf. Rupnow et al. )? The previous examples show
that graphology has been discussed and practised as a regular candidate for
character analysis amongst psychologists and psychiatrists. Even if actors
outside graphology may have considered it as pseudoscience, the esoteric
discourse of psychology during the period investigated was focused rather
on the question, how exactly graphology could be defined as an “exact”
or “objective” scientific discipline. This is also true when we consider the
justified criticism of Ludwig Klage’s anti-intellectualism and his proxim-
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ity to National Socialism. According to Tobias Schneider, Klages’ book ongraphology has been one of the biggest bestsellers on the non-fiction book
market during National Socialism (Schneider : ). His emphasis on
the intuition of the graphological genius must be seen as part of his anti-
intellectualism and in the context of his anti-Semitic worldview (ibid.: ).
Since Klages’ name is strongly connected with graphology in Germany, a le-
gitimate rejection of Klages could easily evoke the view that graphology as
a whole must be equated with National Socialist pseudoscience. Without
intending to defend graphology nor underlining its un-scientific nature,
I want to indicate the fact that graphology constituted a part of ordinary
psychological (and also psychiatric, cf. Schäfer ) research, and while
Klages’ anti-intellectual, anti-Semitic, anti-parlamentarist, anti-liberal, and
anti-Marxist inclinations are part of his graphological reflexions, graphol-
ogy as such was not characterized by a clear-cut political or ideological
commitment. The reference to pseudoscience or systems hostile to sci-
ence has, on a larger scale, for a long time made it more difficult to carry
out thorough epistemic analyses. Research has shown that after  psy-
chologists argued that National Socialism was hostile towards psychology,
and that the discipline was suppressed during this period (see Prinz :
–). This narrative is not well-suited to reflect on the past of one’s own
discipline. To qualify something as pseudoscience can thus easily result
in an unsystematic examination of a historical constellation of knowledge
production. This is true for the case of graphology: In the positivity of the
historical material, graphology emerges as a method of expression anal-
ysis amongst many alternatives; a method rejected by some but further
developed by others as a promising option for character analysis.
Unlike para-psychology, telepathy or occultism, graphology relied on
widespread and accepted practices of interpretation. It was by no means
unusual to draw conclusions about the character of a person from the
handwriting. There was greater disagreement about the forces, properties,
and objects studied in parapsychology. In the case of knowledge fields
such as parapsychology there was disagreement about the very existence
of these things—for example inexplicable contacts of two minds —, about
fundamental assumptions regarding the ontology of the world. In the case
of graphology, the actors presented in this article disagreed only as to




Graphology as Everyday Practice
Albert Hellwig, the examiner of Paul Papst already mentioned in the be-
ginning, was an acknowledged expert for the field of diverse practices on
the edge of official science: occultism, mind reading, clairvoyance, and also
graphology. As a judge and expert he was involved in many cases related
to these practices, mostly due to charges of fraud, and he composed influ-
ential texts on the subject in the s (Hellwig ; ). Said practices
were tolerable to varying degrees. Clairvoyance was mostly regarded as
charlatanry, occultist practices and mind-reading were already controver-
sial and possibly be regarded as sciences. In Hellwig’s view, regarding the
scientific nature of graphology the matter was rather uncontroversial, be-
cause at least some of its forms were firmly integrated into the canon
of science. By referring to graphology, those accused of fraud could claim
a socio-epistemic status, which legitimised them in the eyes of their clients.
My first example for this is a court case of : A Russian woman
was imprisoned in Siberia for four years after the Russian Revolution of
. Following her imprisonment in Siberia and five month of famine
in Riga she migrated to Germany where she hoped to make a living for
herself and her two daughters. During her interrogation she stated that she
thought that the profession of a graphologist would help her to achieve this,
while in effect she then offered chiromancy (the art of reading hands) and
cartomancy (the art of reading the future out of cards) as well. Hellwig
recorded her interrogation as follows:
By graphology Mrs. Zinserling-Sino understands, according to the in-
formation she gave during her interrogation, the study of handwriting
in the direction of the lines, the endurance, the placement of the let-
ters, the beginning of the letters, closed or open letters, the direction
of the individual characters, the marking of the name. She had already
studied in younger {years} graphology by herself, and then trained fur-
ther during a four-year internment in Siberia under the guidance of
the son of Professor Mang in Heidelberg.
Since it was well-known that graphology was conducted by credible
professionals and had “undeniably a scientific basis,” Hellwig wrote in his
expert testimony, Zinserling-Sino suggested that her practices were based
on a reliable basis as well. She suggested to her customers that she worked
on a scientific basis. In the legal system of Weimar Republic this generated
the right of customers to be protected, hence Zinserling-Sino had to prove
in court that her knowledge in graphology was adequate. In principle, Hell-
wig hereby displayed openness and for example in the case of two female
clairvoyants conducted experiments himself to test their reliability. In the
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specific case of Zinserling-Sino, however, Hellwig decided that her vaguestatements about graphology and her alleged studies were not sufficient
prove that she had “penetrated the spirit of this science.” Hellwig fur-
ther substantiated his unfavourable opinion by contacting a certain “Pro-
fessor Mang,” whom he identified as “sports writer and university scholar”
(Sportschriftsteller undUniversitätsgelehrter). Mang in fact affirmed that he
had been interned with Zinserling-Sino in Siberia, but did not remember
having taught her graphology on a regular basis. Also, he had no textbooks
on graphology with him during the imprisonment. As will be shown in the
police section, these tests were typical markers for the juridical system
to validate the scientificity of a given dubitable practice by establishing
if Zinserling-Sino has received a proper training in graphology or read
acknowledged scientific literature. Hellwig’s negative assessment was fur-
ther strengthened by the fact that she practised graphology together with
cartomancy and chiromancy.
This assessment was not necessarily shared by the graphologists’
clients—among them eminent figures. Hence another female graphol-
ogist also accused of fraud, who ran a “scientific graphological-astrological
institute”, regularly advised a priest in employment matters. The priest
testified:
I have been made aware of Madame Gr[ude] by a lady completely un-
known to me, with whom I shared a restaurant table in Erfurt by pure
chance, and with whom I talked about the interpretation of handwrit-
ing, graphology, etc.
He then underlined that Grude worked “quite decidedly on a scien-
tific basis,” that she was an honest person who worked for the “good and
true,” and that her graphological expert opinions had always been cor-
rect. In a letter to Hellwig, Grude herself announced that she could name
“higher court officers” who used her services when required, from which
she would, however, distance herself as long as possible from for reasons
of discretion.
The discussion about fraud reappears in the papers of Karl Marbe, who
was professor of psychology at Würzburg University. He was regarded as
another eminent expert for the discussion on border areas of science. In
Hellwig’s papers we also find a reference to Marbe: the defence in a clair-
voyance trial referred to Marbe, because he appreciated Marbe’s work on
the divining rod. In this  case the defence judged clairvoyance as
a promising option for which the state should offer formalised training.
In  the rectorate of Würzburg University received a letter from the
“Bezirksamt” (district office) of Wolfach in Southern Germany in a court
case against a self-proclaimed graphologist who offered interpretations of
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the character based on handwriting (for  Mark, which was significantly
cheaper than the expert opinions of graphological institutes ranging from
 to  Mark). This graphologist referred to Würzburg University and
claimed that there existed a chair for graphology. Although he did not
pretend having studied there, he thus wanted to emphasize the scientific
character of graphology as a practice. He testified:
I am a graphologist and capable of determining the character traits,
abilities, passions and talents of the original scribe on the basis of
a writing sample. That is, I do not engage in fortune-telling. For the
practice of interpretation, I usually ask the person concerned to write
the name and place of birth on a paper. I then tell them en passant
based on a table on which day of the week they were born. Today
graphology is a science, for which chairs have been established at the
universities in Bonn and Würzburg.
Apart from firmly denying that such a chair existed at Würzburg Uni-
versity, Marbe concluded in his answer that there existed no sharp bound-
aries between “graphologists who offer themselves in newspapers and write
books and those who roam fairs and pubs.” This was a stark attack on
his colleagues, who in the same period tried to establish graphology as
a science. In the case of Marbe, this is understandable because he firmly
opted for a statistically based kind of experimental psychology and was
in general doubtful regarding practices of “interpretation” (Deutung) or
“intuition,” which existed in some schools of psychology and graphology,
especially in that of Ludwig Klages, whom he most probably had in mind
in his criticism. Especially the emphasis of the personality of the psychol-
ogist as a trained interpreter cast doubt for Marbe on the scientificity of
this kind of practice.
Even if by gathering all relevant court cases it would not be possible
to measure the graphological underground of Weimar Republic. Therefore
these three cases can only indicate that graphology could act as a reference
point for gaining enough “scientific capital” (Bourdieu ) in order to le-
gitimise the interpretation of handwriting as a scientifically valid practice.
The graphologists emphasized that their practices were “scientific,” and
they underlined that they had a proper education or that they referred to
books that were scientifically recognised. According to the police regula-
tions (see last section), this was the prerequisite for them to be able to
carry out their profession, since otherwise they would have been treated
defrauders and punished. The fact that graphology could at least be prac-
tised to a certain degree as science provided the opportunity to use it as
an argument for legitimising the own divinatory and characterological ex-
pertise. Graphology therefore provided an option to bridge a social and
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epistemic divide. The graphologists could rely on an existing demand forgraphological expert opinions, which was an indicator of a more general
demand for expert systems evidencing character types.
Marbe, a staunch defender of the ideals of scientificity, objectivity, and
quantification, also published manuals for statistics and probability theory,
and had been interested in the practice of graphological institutes before
. In his answer to the “Bezirksamt” Marbe emphasized, that there cer-
tainly existed interrelations between several “characters of handwriting.”
Experimental Skills—Commentaries of Psychologists on
Graphology
In  psychologist and philosopher Aloys Wenzl presented a systematic
overview of the schools of scientific graphology. According to him, the
main schools of contemporary psychology were that of Ludwig Klages,
Robert Saudek, Max Pulver, Noeck Sylvus, and Broder Christiansen
(Wenzl : –). Like Marbe, Wenzl also advocated a statistically
based graphology and distrusted Klages’ assessment of the level of form
(Formniveau) by an unteachable competence of seeing (ibid.: ) and
questioned the usefulness of trying to integrate graphology into National
Socialist racial science (ibid.: ).
Marbe allows us to retrace the ambivalence of psychologists towards
graphology. As a student of the Würzburg school of “Denkpsychologie”
(thought psychology) represented by Oswald Külpe (–), Marbe
was interested in a form of psychology that made thinking and thought
the object of an objective and experimental science. He wanted to give
the applied areas of psychology solid experimental footing and therefore
was—like many of his colleagues—eager to mark the boundaries of psy-
chology that in the s, did not yet possess the “Diplomprüfungsord-
nung” of , which created a framework of professional practice sanc-
tioned by the state. However, Marbe by no means excluded graphology
from psychology as part of the analysis of expression. In his papers there
are documents that show the planning of a practical course in graphology
during which he asked his students to examine a letter from Nietzsche.
At the same time Marbe mistrusted the commercial exploitation of psy-
chology of expression, which became fashionable in the s. Besides the
mostly accepted psychotechnical institutes there also existed a range of
suspicious practices, among them those of graphological institutes. These
institutes promised company owners to test the future employees and pro-
vided expertise on the loyalty of husbands or wives.
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Fig. 1 First Page of a Leaflet of a Graphological Institute; Karl Marbe papers, Material-
sammlung, Adolf-Würth-Zentrum, Würzburg.
In Fig.  you see an example: The “Graphologische Institut Cornelius
GmbH”, which existed since  and offered, with absolute discretion,
character sketches, analyses, and advisory analyses for , , and  Mark.
The most expensive service was a comparative analysis of two handwriting
samples, which were tested to determine whether the characters of the
writers matched or not (a kind of dating agency for the early twentieth
century).
Marbe choose the pseudonym Schlachter, and sent the same sample of
his handwriting to eight of these institutes, the most expensive of which
was the “Graphologische Beratungsstelle” (Graphological Consulting) of
Elizabeth Worms in Cologne for . Mark, while grandmaster Lud-
wig Klages charged the comparatively small amount of . Mark. Even
if Marbe appears to have been sceptical of graphological practice from
the outset, the fact that he invested so much energy to test it—and that
he included it in his teaching—indicates that he nevertheless remained
openminded for the possibility that graphological expertise might pro-
vide a compelling option for character interpretation. Marbe’s intervention
therefore reveals a larger picture than just mistrust of dilettantes. At least in
 he invested time and money to scrutinize, if there existed a solid basis
for graphology. In the end, however, the results of his investigations were
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rather disappointing. The character sketches he received were phrased ina way that they hardly managed to disguise their flattering intent. Here
a testimony by L. Meyer, a Swiss graphologist, delivered July :
The whole style of your writing suggests a sympathetic, benevolent
personality, which, however, does not exactly know what she wants
and, for example, does not give in due to weakness but rather to your
peaceful nature—where she can reconcile it with her views and prin-
ciples.
Even if Marbe had been initially interested in the graphological insti-
tutes, the results of his survey obviously did not convince him. In his
answer to the Bezirksamt in , in the case of the above-mentioned
amateur graphologist, Marbe mentioned this research:
Today such investigations are not yet available, not even in the first-
ever beginnings, and the books of the so-called modern graphologists,
including Mr. Klages, are rather based on opinions than on reasonably
reliable, critical statistical experiences. Under these circumstances it is
not surprising that recently, when I had one and the same handwriting
assessed by numerous graphologists for a fee, I received apart from
very general, commonplace phrases, contrary statements.
Whenever you go through the archives of psychologists who dealt with
further developing individual psychology in general or psychology of ex-
pression in particular, you will come across graphology. Marbe’s stance
towards graphology can thus be interpreted as a typical answer of psychol-
ogy towards a more mundane expertise on human character. For example,
the psychologist and important actor of the Institute for Applied Psy-
chology in Berlin Otto Lipmann (–) argued in a paper “On the
Applied Fields of Psychology”—presumably delivered in the s—that
the “general knowledge of human nature” (allgemeine Menschenkenntnis)
could only come to some questionable generalizations. Even if some ad-
mirable judges of character—Lipmann names Goethe, Shakespeare, and
Bismarck—demonstrated impressive skills, the identification of the laws of
the prediction of individual behaviour was reserved for scientific psychol-
ogy. In that context, graphology marked for Lipmann too the boundaries
of science: was it possible to use handwriting to predict human behaviour?
At the end of the day Lippman, like Marbe, only relied on statistics:
Only by scientific means will we be able to obtain information about
the much disputed problem of graphology today—about the question
whether and which psychological characteristics are documented in
handwriting. The path that psychology must take to answer these and
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similar questions can only be that of statistics: we have to examine
whether the majority of people who have a certain psychic quality also
have a certain peculiarity of writing.
Unlike Klages and Wieser, who relied on the personality of the inter-
preter, Marbe and Lipmann proposed to demarcate precisely the bound-
aries of science by de-personalizing the assessment of handwriting on the
basis of statistics.
After WorldWar II and the National Socialist era, during which graphol-
ogy had been practised by many German psychologists, the sceptic recep-
tion of graphology as a scientifically unsound discipline became part of
a more general narrative of the history of psychology during National So-
cialism. According to this narrative, psychology was suppressed during
National Socialism and remained scientifically unproductive. The fact that
graphology took an upswing at that time could then be seen exactly as
an indication that the scientific principles of psychology during National
Socialism were not in good shape. It can be seen as part of a more general
post-war discourse on the purported “suppression” of psychology during
National Socialism and alleged decline of science during that era: Ulfried
Geuter and others have shown that this narrative of the decline of psychol-
ogy during the Nazi period is misleading at the very least, and has served
as an excuse for psychologists after WW II not to deal with the behaviour
of psychologists during the Nazi era. Wilhelm Peters (–) was
one of the few Jewish psychologists who returned to Germany after .
Being undenominational, Peters was nevertheless forced to retirement in
 due to his Jewish background and migrated to England. He then be-
came a professor in Istanbul in  and built up the psychological institute
there. In  he returned to Würzburg as emeritus (see Stock ). In an
unpublished article about the “Misery of German Psychology” he openly
criticised psychologists who had collaborated with the Nazi regime. From
the perspective of Anglo-American methods (that is, statistical evaluation
and experimental sophistication) he denounced the superiority of “spec-
ulative” approaches in German psychology, emerging in the first meeting
of German psychologists after WW II in . Especially the widespread
use of graphology amongst psychologists marked for him the “misery” of
German psychology, while social psychology was largely neglected. Pe-
ters had been an assistant to Marbe earlier (–) and so it is not
surprising that he showed the same scepticism towards graphology. One
could investigate further this rejection of interpretation (Deutung), which
is a characteristic of the Würzburg School, for example for Maria Zillig
(–after ) and Maria Schorn (/–). Here it should suf-
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fice to refer to the examples quoted at the beginning, which show that alsoafter  graphology continued to be practiced as a science.
Interferences
In practice, one of the most important tasks of graphology was to de-
termine and evaluate the regularity of a handwriting. Klages called this
entity “Formniveau” (level of form), which reappeared in many guises as
the characteristics of a person’s handwriting that seemed to provide some
insight into her or his inner stability. I just give two examples from Roda
Wieser’s extensive research on prisoners’ and policemen’s handwritings.
Wieser, a former student of Klages, was a certified expert for the in-
terpretation of handwriting for the Vienna District Courts I and II, and
worked for the Institute for Criminal Law and Criminalistics (Institut für
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft und Kriminalistik) on an irregular basis
(Staudigl-Ciechowicz : ). Fig.  displays Wieser’s reproduction of
the handwriting of a painter’s assistant, who had raped his own daughter.
The man’s handwriting is extremely irregular, providing insight into his
inability to balance between his “will” (Wille) and his “drives” (Triebe):
Fig. , however, depicts the handwriting of a policeman, which though
written in a fast hand, possessed in Wieser’s view sufficient amount of reg-
ularity. For her this irregularity suggested a strong emotional life, whereas
the regular handwriting proved that “a healthy will” (ein gesunder Wille)
could control this emotionality:
These versions of graphology can be differentiated based upon the
amount of trust given to the interpreter of the handwriting and the degree
of experimental accuracy sought in the recording, preservation, and quan-
titative evaluation of the handwriting. As in other evidence techniques, the
figure of the “genius,” the inborn talent existed for graphology as well. Ac-
cording to Wieser, a graphological diagnosis was only feasible against the
background of an a skill (Kunst) that was comparable to the medical diag-
nosis, which should be based on medical education, but at the same time
and above all required intuition (Wieser : ). Likewise Friedrich von
Rohden, a distinct supporter of racist scientific approaches to the human
mind well before National Socialism, emphasized in his handbook on crim-
inal biology that the Formniveau of the handwriting could only be captured
intuitively, even if all aspects of conservational and experimental aspects
of forensic investigation had been taken into account (Rohden : ).
Alongside psychology of expression, typological methods, or experimen-
tal methods, graphology provided an option for visualising the inner life.
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Fig. 2 Handwriting sample from Wieser’s comparison between prisoner’s and police-
men’s handwriting, Wieser 1933: 8 (Figure 1 in Wieser).
As becomes evident in the writings of Wieser, the central goal of this tech-
nique consisted in determining interferences in an otherwise homogeneous
series of events mostly interpreted as a curve, and sometimes compared
to the rhythm that existed in many natural processes (cf. Wenzl: , quot-
ing Klages). With reference to the enthusiasm of experimental physiologi-
cal research in the nineteenth century (cf. Schmidgen ) graphologists
hoped that the movement of writing itself would form a kind of natural
curve providing a basis for diagnosing the life of the soul. Friedrich von
Rohden expressed this most succinctly:
In writing, nature itself provides us with a curve. Writing is created
by movements that are registered by the pen on the paper in a similar
way to the movements of the muscles on the kymographion drum in
physiological experiments. (Rohden : )
That is, in the view of Rohden graphology provided a natural curve.
Unlike the more refined experimental methods this had the advantage of
not requiring any artificial set-up. In this form graphology is nevertheless
comparable in its epistemic structure to a range of other evidence tech-
niques, which mostly used some form of automatic inscription device, such
as kymograph that produced a curve.
In his article “What’s in a Line?” Norton Wise has underscored the
centrality of the curve in European sciences of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury with an emphasis on Berlin, where experimental physiologist Emil
Du Bois-Reymond (–) made the curve an emblem of the Berlin
Physical Society in  (Wise ). As illustrated by Rohden’s quote
above, handwriting was re-interpreted against the background of the ubiq-
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Fig. 3 Handwriting sample from Wieser’s comparison between prisoner’s and police-
men’s handwriting, Wieser 1933: 10 (Figure 4 in Wieser).
uity of the curve in science as the expression of nature: handwriting was
a curve as well! In this sense, graphology as well as the subsequent de-
velopment of lie detectors in the United States were all methods of inter-
preting the level of disturbances in a curve (Alder ). Publications in
these fields are consequently filled with more or less exact curves. Henning
Schmidgen has shown that since the mid-nineteenth century, brain-time
experiments measuring ever-shorter reaction times have been an essential
part of establishing a science of the human mind (Schmidgen ). For
physio-psychologists of the nineteenth century such as Exner or Helmholtz
it was quite common to assume the existence of the “unconscious”—for
instance “unconscious conclusions”—and to see the reaction time exper-
iments recorded on the basis of curves as part of the investigation of
precisely this unconscious (ibid.: –). Physiologically trained psychol-
ogists such as Hugo Münsterberg have further developed these methods
and tried, for one thing, to increasingly improve the measuring methods
and, then again, to create more natural experimental conditions (ibid.:
–). The curve here was the external sign of an internal automatism,
which could thus provide information about internal processes beyond the
will of the test person. Considering handwriting as a natural curve of in-
ward expression thus meant returning to the psychophysiological tradition,
and therefore graphologists tried to keep up with the reproduction tech-
nologies of physiologists (see for photography Hirschi : ; Schäfer
). This emphasis on experimental sophistication was understood as
part of a boundary work that distances itself form amateur techniques of
evidencing the psyche.
That is, we can distinguish different kinds of boundary work in the
knowledge field of graphology: one strategy is the construction of the
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graphological genius guided by medical diagnosis. The heritage of experi-
mental physiology emerges in the increasingly minute and exact curve, thus
revealing the epistemic ideal of the direct readability of nature. Therefore
this epistemology of graphology requires a clear distinction between the
interpreter, and the sophistication of the material interpreted. Emphasising
the abilities of the interpreter was mostly used for advocating the devel-
opment of professional educational systems and laws prohibiting amateurs
to practice the techniques in question. Highly sophisticated measurement
techniques, in turn, were used to support arguments for the technical
development of devices not be used by amateurs. In Wieser’s work all
these strategies of authorization are interlinked. She presented modern
techniques of representation and evaluation of handwriting (photography,
statistics, an elaborated conceptual framework) and at the same time em-
phasized the indispensable value of talent. This professionalization strategy
could serve as a demarcation towards para-disciplines as well as towards
amateurs. For actors who earned a part of their income from expert opin-
ions in court this twofold demarcation stratetegy was particularly useful;
it legitimized expertise as an expression of both private talent and official
science. This kind of expert therefore emerges as talented scientist.
The Police
The special status of graphology among other border areas of psychologi-
cal (or psychiatric) expression analysis is likewise reflected in the practices
of control of the police. The Saxon interior ministry passed a decree
in  forbidding public demonstrations of clairvoyance. In , the
Saxon economics ministry inquired whether the  decree applied to
graphology and phrenology as well. The ministry held the view that while
a scientific form of graphology and phrenology existed, thus legitimating
its practice, at the same time a lot of fraud had to be thwarted. As a result
the police had to determine if a given graphologist acted “scientifically” or
fraudulent. The police in Saxony worked on corresponding guidelines, and
in May  the Leipzig Police Commissioner issued the “Guidelines for
the Assessment of the Exercise of Graphology on a Recognised Scientific
Basis” (Richtlinien für die Beurteilung einer Ausübung der Graphologie auf
anerkannt wissenschaftlicher Grundlage). One solution of the Leipzig
police was reference to an authority: A graphologist could prove his or
her scientificity by an expert opinion either of Ludwig Klages himself—the
“founder” of scientific graphology—or of one of his students. Likewise
the expert opinion of graphologist Siegfried Römer of the Prussian Police
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Institute was mentioned in specific, because Klages had “officially autho-rised” him as his representative. At the same time, the Guidelines defined
criteria for the non-scientific use of graphology. The criteria applying to
Unwissenschaftlichkeit included: inadequacy of the graphologist’s “level of
education” (Bildungsniveau) or “personality” (Persönlichkeit); the graphol-
ogist’s former practice of graphology, astrology, chiromancy, phrenology,
cartomancy, and clairvoyance; his/her work for advertising (Reklame)
or “grapological mailboxes” (graphologische Briefkästen) in newspapers;
his/her use of “non-scientific brochures” (unwissenschaftliche Broschüren)
to disseminate “graphological false doctrines” (graphologische Irrlehren)
and to recruit customers; or his/her assessment of more than just “char-
acter.” It is evident that while the definition of graphology’s scientificity
in these guidelines was rather concrete and clear, much vagueness was
involved when it came to define which practice was non-scientific. The
Guidelines were intended to help with the implementation of a police
regulation (Polizeiverordnung) published on th April . Said decree
stipulated that police officers should intervene against graphologists, “if
they cannot demonstrate that they only interpret character and that they
were trained by a scientifically recognised personality.”
The expert opinions of Marbe and Hellwig as well as the police com-
mentaries in Leipzig make clear that graphology had a mixed status. For
one thing, it was considered a practice of quacks that should be forbidden.
Then again, graphology was considered a scientific discipline, and formal
training for graphologists was initialised.
In addition to controlling graphology practices, police officers reflected
on using graphology themselves. One of the most accepted forms of the
analysis of handwriting samples was the collection of handwritings estab-
lished at Berlin police headquarters, led by Hans Schneickert (–),
chief of the Berlin police records department, from  to . In Berlin
the handwriting samples were not used as the basis of a character analysis
but to compare two or more handwriting samples with each other. Schne-
ickert, who wrote an important handbook on interrogation technique, was
convinced of the practical usefulness of graphology as well. In  he
underlined its status as an “art” as opposed to a “science.” He stressed that
“science” and “art” were the cornerstones of any psychological evaluation
of an expression of the soul (Schneickert : ).
We can discern a growing interest in graphology as character diagnosis
in the s both, within the psychological practices of the police as well as
within the military (cf. Geuter ). Hence, for example, the most influ-
ential interrogation technique handbooks published before , included
new chapters on graphology in later editions. One of these handbooks was
that of Hellwig, first issued in  (Hellwig ). In the  edition,
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Hellwig added a chapter on graphology, which also made it into the edition
of  (Hellwig ; : –). There he basically reproduced the
position of Munich based public prosecutor Franz Meinert on graphology,
who had written another influential handbook on interrogation technique
(Meinert ). Meinert believed that analysing the handwriting allowed
to draw conclusions about the “resistance energy” (Widerstandsenergie),
“resistance intelligence” (Widerstandsintelligenz), and the “emotional life”
(Gefühlsleben) of a suspect (Hellwig : ). In the authoritarian scheme
of Meinert’s interrogation technique this information provided an impor-
tant starting point for the interrogation, given that one of the most impor-
tant tasks was to estimate the amount of emotional pressure a police officer
could exercise during an interrogation before the suspect abandoned her
or his will to resist. Hence personality assessment was crucial for Meinert,
and graphology was one of the means he recommended for police officers.
Meinert’s use of graphology is deeply authoritarian. This is a symptom
of his general authoritarian understanding of police interrogation, which
at least implies sympathy with torture as Nicola Willenberg demonstrates.
She points out that Meinert’s reflections on interrogation technique and its
implicit legitimation of the abuse of state authority were still published un-
modified in the  edition and only changed in  (Willenberg :
–). For Meinert, graphology was a legitimate tool within an ensemble
of strategies for assessing the suspect, ultimately forcing him to submit to
the authority of the officer.
Conclusion
In her book about German traditions of parapsychology and psychical re-
search, Heather Wolffram proposed to call these fields of knowledge “bor-
der sciences,” because they continually stimulated a debate on legitimate
objects and procedures of science (Wolffram : ; cf. Wolffram )
and even if they have been pursued by established scientists opened up
a space of scientific agency for amateurs. It is exactly through an analysis of
these border sciences (or “fringe sciences,” ibid.: ), as Wolffram contends,
that one could study processes of disciplinarisation and professionalisation.
Graphology has not been a border science in the sense of parapsychology
or psychic research, since it mostly did not deal with objects, whose very
existence was questioned, or with forces unknown to science (with the ex-
ception of “meta-graphology” presentend in Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie
during the s, Marcinowski ). Secondly, graphology, mostly did not
propose epistemic techniques that were controversial in themselves, but
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in their applications and inferences. Graphology can rather be describedwithin the framework of Thomas Gieryn’s concept of boundary work, since
it formed the starting point to continually make explicit and negotiate the
boundaries of legitimate scientific practice (Gieryn ). By claiming that
every movement of expression could in one way or another be traced back
to some cause or motivation in humans, graphology has been part of the
large field of methods that sought to infer inner motivations and character
traits from external features.
One aspect of this article concerns the status of expert systems for evalu-
ating personality and character. Within the psy-disciplines and other fields
of knowledge since the late nineteenth century this practical application has
been the object of ongoing negotiation. A network of different experts has
legitimised itself with regard to each other and to non-experts, while the
latter status had to be defined either in epistemic terms or by social stand-
ing and education. Given the precarious—epistemic and social—existence
of graphology compared to psychiatry or medicine, it is not surprising that
the graphologists Caspar Hirschi analysed in his compelling article about
the Dreyfus affair presented their expertise in the style of assertive rigidity
(Hirschi ). The same applies for expert statements from psychology
of testimony (Aussagepsychologie), and it might be noted in general that
expert testimonies in court, especially from not yet firmly established dis-
ciplines, tend to have a rather assertive style. That style differs significantly
from texts by the same actors published in scientific journals in their own
field.
Graphology’s use as an interpretation of the character or personality
remained controversial. One can agree with Hirschi that its use in this sense
was rather relevant for the economic sector and continued to attract actors,
which used these techniques in areas regarded as charlatanry by official,
institutionalised science. Epistemologically graphology remained just as
questionable as the connection with the fairground, and the commercial
greed of graphologists let it appear socio-economically objectionable. This
dubious nature of graphology repeatedly raised the question of correct
methods and appropriate subject positions of character interpretation, thus
generally unfolding a subject-political and epistemic conflict about the
possibility and scientific form of character interpretation in general.
Graphology relied on a very common cultural technique and on very
widespread traces of that practice: on writing and its products. This
cultural technique has stimulated systems of interpretation long before
graphology aimed to use these systems in order to establish a science.
I argue that this has been possible on something that Ludwik Fleck has
called a “pre-idea,” some rather vague and widespread idea, that struc-
tures practices of research without necessarily being made explicit (Fleck
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). In this case, a quite relevant pre-idea was the belief that in some
form the writer’s mind would be present or readable in the handwriting.
This concept facilitated interpretation systems of writing and scripture
that assembled heterogeneous actors sharing that same pre-idea. Various
systems of proof, research, and different subject constructions could now
be mobilised to claim the legitimacy of interpretations and of actors giving
these interpretations. With the case-study on graphology I want to point
to a much larger field of these zones of boundary work, which could be
analysed analogically: it is a typical feature of psy-disciplines (and also
other disciplines such as sociology) that they relate to or even build upon
every day practices, giving them a scientific explanation: the interpretation
of facial expressions, of dreams, or of interactions. Therefore, it must
be considered a characteristic feature of these disciplines that they are
situated between scientific and non-scientific actors, making it necessary
to legitimise and explain the benefit and structure of these new scientific
explanations of all too well-known phenomena. It was therefore necessary
to make the norms of the own practice explicit and impose them as le-
gitimate. However, by assembling these diverse actors of different social
and epistemic standing, graphology stimulated a discourse on scientificity
comparable to the discourse on the border sciences Wolffram describes.
In this article I have focused on three types of contributions to graphol-
ogy: that of the actors on the margins of official science; that of acknowl-
edged psychologists developing further and questioning the techniques
of graphology, and that of the police. For a more comprehensive assess-
ment, the discussions in para-psychology could further enrich this anal-
ysis. Graphology was a scientific field whose hegemony was gained by
reference to scientificity, or in terms of Pierre Bourdieu: “scientific capital”
(Bourdieu ). Psychologists, psychiatrists, police officers, jurists, and
philosophers thereby presented different epistemic ideals, which in their
eyes should form the basis of legitimate practices in graphology. The one
side choose to put the emphasis on the valorisation of the interpreter of
the handwriting. Thus, Ludwig Klages, Roda Wieser, or Friedrich von Ro-
hden subscribed to an understanding of graphology that considered the
ability to interpret and characterize handwriting a talent. As described
above, this professionalization strategy composed of personal talent and
institutional authorization was particularly suitable for experts in court.
In this way, they were able to present themselves as irreplaceable and sci-
entifically legitimized at the same time. For university psychologists, the
emphasis on personal talent was not necessary, but the emphasis on scien-
tific procedures was important: Karl Marbe, Otto Lipmann, or Aloys Wenzl
emphasised the necessity of a de-personalized technical apparatus—either
a statistical evaluation or a sophisticated experimental technique—as pre-
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supposition for any legitimate graphological practice. Both demarcationstrategies served as a boundary work separating proper science from non-
science, either from the practice charlatans at the fairground, or from the
practices of commercial institutes for vocational guidance, couple coun-
selling, and consulting for companies.
The view of the police on either the charlatans or its own use of graphol-
ogy reflected a more widespread user knowledge compared to academia.
As usual in interrogation techniques, police officers would acquire knowl-
edge from psychology or other disciplines, but then emphasise the value of
experience (Erfahrenheit), made in practice (cf. for example Rathsam ;
Gennat ; Salaw ). For them, graphology was part of a wider field
of techniques to evaluate the personality of witnesses or suspects dur-
ing interrogations, which became more fashionable during a general re-
evaluation of methods to analyse expression during the s and s.
The perspective of the “charlatans” adds to the widespread use of
graphology by graphological institutes. As the court cases demonstrate,
there existed a widespread demand and willingness to accept the services
of persons claiming an expertise in the interpretation of handwriting.
These persons could choose between different options to legitimise them-
selves. Firstly they relied on the values of science and used the associated
rhetoric, building “scientific institutes” for graphology and referring to
books and educational bio-histories which, in their eyes, could count as
scientific. They could, secondly, underscore the value of their personality
as interpreters and aim to choose environments and atmospheres within
which the impression of their personality would be more pronounced.
One can expect that in most cases their strategies of social legitimisation
might have been a mixture of both.
Graphology as an insight into character, the predispositions, and the
type of human beings never lost contact to everyday practices and the es-
oteric circles of scientific experts, thereby generating a particular need for
the experts to distance themselves from what could not count as legitimate
knowledge. As indicated by the widespread use in companies, graphology
was also part of a growing interest in controlling or categorising people.
Carlo Ginzburg has therefore interpreted these ever-more refined forms
of sign-reading as symptom of a growing density of social control, which
was also reflected by refined practices of categorising people, for example
through fingerprints (Ginzburg ). Graphology as an offer to know the
inner life of suspects, as an option for enterprises to test their employees,
and as daily practice of character analysis on fairgrounds and in pubs played
a part in this field of social control. The desirability of a fast, safe, and nat-
ural method of determining the character of a person with certainty also
points to a transformation in the social structure of work, in which the hu-
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man factor has become increasingly important as a means of production. It
was precisely this field that was structured by the competition of amateur
graphologists, psychologists, psychiatrists and commercial institutes who,
after the rise of test psychology during World War I, wanted to skim off
some of the economic potential. The psychologists considered in this pa-
per—Karl Marbe, Aloys Wenzl, William Stern, Otto Lipmann, Roda Wieser
and Ludwig Klages—were ambivalent regarding this economic exploitation
of their professional competence: for one thing, they needed proof for the
usefulness of psychology; then again, they underscored the values of dis-
interestedness and objectivity, which could appear to be threatened. The
amateurs and commercial institutes felt the inverse challenge and never-
theless wanted to present themselves as scientific actors in a situation of
economic profit. They needed the symbolic power of science just as science
needed the economization of its epistemic techniques while at the same
time distancing itself from them. It was exactly because of this that the
negotiation of epistemic ideals, techniques, and a boundary work between
science and non-science became so important.
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 Archives of Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health (IGPP),
Freiburg, papers of Albert Hellwig, X, —Gutachten Hellseher, expert testimony of
Hellwig, th December .
 Ibid.
 Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Staatsarchiv Leipzig,  Polizeipräsidium Leipzig.
 Cf. Ploog (), to give just one example. Ploog provides a short history of graphology,
in which he too names Ludwig Klages as its founder (ibid.: ).
 Cf. Michon (); Hirschi ().
 Schneickert valued his contributions, claiming that Pophal had laid the foundations of
a “bewegungsphysiologische Graphologie,” a kind of graphology based on the analysis
of the movements during writing (Schneickert : ).
 SchweizerischesLiteraturarchiv,Bern, Switzerland, Franziska Baumgarten papers, B--
ISR, letter from Dr. Pokorny, Tel Aviv, rd May .
 Therefore Bobertag strongly recommended success controls of graphological evalua-
tions (Bobertag : –).
 Throughout the National Socialist era the more “intuitive” approaches were criticized,
and more statistically procedural forms of graphology that were critically opposed to
National Socialist racial science were represented, cf. (Wenzl ).
 See for the discussion about forensic psychology with a focus on William Stern, Paul
Plaut, and Albert Hellwig (Wolffram ).
 Archives of IGPP, Bestand /, papers of Albert Hellwig, X, —Gutachten Hellseher,
th December .
 Ibid.
 Archives of IGPP, Bestand /, papers of Albert Hellwig, I, .—Fall Maria Hessel:
This file contains notes on a session with two female clairvoyants in a prison—an ex-
perimental situation chosen because any contact to other persons should be excluded.
 Ibid., X, —Gutachten Hellseher, th December .
 Ibid., pp. –.
 Ibid., letter from th November .
 Ibid.
 Ibid., letter from th November .
 The most important research on Marbe stems fromMülberger (; ).
 Ibid., I, .—Fall Maria Hessel, “Bericht über die Hauptverhandlung,” th July , cf.
Marbe ().
 Ibid.
 Archivesof Adolf-Würth-Zentrum,WürzburgUniversity, papers ofMarbe, K ,
Bezirksamt an das Rektorat der Universität Würzburg, Wolfach, th February .
 Ibid., Marbe to Bezirksamt Wolfach, th Feburary .
 For a systematic overview over the schools of graphology cf. Wenzl ().
 Ibid.
 In the history of psychology, the establishment of the “Diplomprüfungsordnung” in
 is judged to be a major event in the professionalization of the discipline as it facil-
itated a formalized professional training; cf. Geuter (: –).
 Archives of Adolfs-Würth-Zentrum,WürzburgUniversity, papers ofMarbe,M[aterial].
 These were in specific: “Seminar für Ausdruckskunde” (München), “Graphologis-
ches Institut H. Gernstner” (Wolfegg), “Institut für wissenschaftliche Graphologie”
(München), L. Meyer (Maienfeld bei Ragaz, Switzerland), “Graphologisches Institut”
(Köln), Ludwig Klages (Kilchberg am Zürisee, Switzerland), “Institut zur Förderung der
wissenschaftlichenHandschriftenbeurteilung G.m.b.H.” (Berlin), “Institut für graphol-
ogische Forschung” (München), “Graphologische Beratungsstelle” (Köln).
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 Archives of Adolf-Würth-Zentrum,Würzburg University, papers of Marbe, U, part .
 Marbe to BezirksamtWolfach, th February , Archives of Adolf-Würth-Zentrum,
Würzburg University, papers of Marbe, K , correspondence with Rossner.
 Papers of Otto Lipmann, National Library of Israel, Jerusalem, ARC. * , Vorträge 
(–), paper “Anwendungsgebiete der Psychologie”, p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 See especially Geuter (); Ash (: ); Prinz ().
 Archives of Adolf-Würth-Zentrum, Würzburg University, papers of Wilhelm Peters,
WN .
 Schweizerisches Literaturarchiv, Bern, papers of Franziska Baumgarten, B--NATI.
 Ibid.: “German psychology of personality and character has been embedded in philo-
sophical speculation, and even the application of character analysis to personal ‘coun-
selling’ does not abstain from such speculation. Graphology is considered as an estab-
lished science, social psychology—in theWestern sense of the term—is almost entirely
neglected, psychologists having worked with the armed forces are abundant in number
and weight. All work in applied psychology, however, is handicapped by lack of readi-
ness and ability to submit raw empirical data to scientific check.”
 Klages (); cf. Lück (: ) and Geuter ().
 SächsStA, StA- L,  PolizeipräsidiumLeipzig, PP-V , Bl. .
 Ibid., Bl. , the guidelines were published on th May .
 Ibid.
 Ibid. p. .
 Ibid.
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